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Argument
1.

Mr. Arriaga's Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary
Contrary to the State's assertions, Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea was not

knowing or voluntary. The State first makes two procedural arguments, both of
~

which this Court could disregard. The State also boldly argues that Mr. Arriaga's
plea was knowing and voluntary, but in doing so it fails to adequately address the
record-specifically, Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea assertions during the plea colloquy.
Mr. Arriaga will take the State's arguments in turn.
1.1

Mr. Arriaga's Guilty Plea Claim Is Not Procedurally Barred

The State argues that this Court should not address Mr. Arriaga's guilty
plea claim because it is procedurally barred; essentially, the State asserts that Mr.
Arriaga could have raised his challenge to his guilty plea in the district court
through a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and because he did not, he is barred
from raising challenges to his guilty plea in this postconviction proceeding. See
Utah Code§ 78B-9-106(1)(c).
The State relies heavily on this Court's opinion in Brown v. State, 2015 UT
App 254,361 P.3d 124. In that case, this Court upheld a district court's reasoning
that a defendant's postconviction challenges to his guilty pleas were procedurally
barred because he could have moved to withdraw the guilty pleas in the six-week
time period between the entry of his guilty pleas and his sentencing hearing, but
he did not. Brown, 2015 UT App 254, ,r,r 22-24. Because the defendant did not
challenge his guilty pleas in the district court through a motion to withdraw, he
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Ci)

was procedurally barred from challenging his guilty pleas in a postconviction
proceeding. Id. ,r 24.
This Court, however, should not extend the reasoning of Brown to this case
for two reasons.

First, the facts of the two cases are entirely different. Unlike in

Brown, where the defendant had a six-week period to file his motion to
withdraw, here Mr. Arriaga had minutes between when he pleaded guilty and
when he was sentenced. (R. 415-16.) The district court sentenced Mr. Arriaga
immediately after he pleaded guilty. (Id.)
When the district court asked Mr. Arriaga's attorney what was "anticipated
with sentencing," Mr. Arriaga's attorney responded, "You Honor, we had
discussed his options. He would ask the court to sentence him today." (R. 415.)
The fact that Mr. Arriaga's attorney had discussed sentencing options with Mr.
Arriaga before the plea hearing should carry little weight given that the parties do
not dispute that Mr. Arriaga did not speak English, Mr. Arriaga's attorney did not
speak Spanish (Mr. Arriaga's native tongue), and Mr. Arriaga's attorney did not
use an interpreter in his meetings with Mr. Arriaga. (See R. 1177-78.) Unlike the
defendant in Brown, Mr. Arriaga simply did not have the luxury of time to think
about withdrawing his guilty plea in the few minutes between when he pleaded
guilty and when he was sentenced.

Second, Brown precluding a defendant from challenging his
guilty plea in postconviction proceedings if he did not seek to
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withdraw his plea in district court eviscerates subsection 2(c) of the
plea withdrawal statute, Utah Code § 77-13-6. The plea withdrawal statute
requires a defendant to move to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing. Utah
Code§ 77-13-6(2)(b). If a defendant fails to do so, he is procedurally barred from
~

raising a challenge to a guilty plea after sentencing or on direct appeal. Gailey v.

State, 2016 UT 35, ,I,I 14-20, 379 P.3d 1278. But under subsection 2(c) of the plea
withdrawal statute, a defendant who does not file a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea before sentencing "shall ... pursue[]" a "challenge to a guilty plea" under
"Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act." Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(c).
By not allowing a defendant in postconviction proceeding to raise
challenges to his guilty plea if he has not first moved to withdraw his guilty plea,
the Brown court negated subsection 2(c) of the plea withdrawal statute, which
explicitly allows a defendant who has not filed a timely motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in district court to challenge the plea in post-conviction proceedings.

See generally In re J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, ,I 22, 280 P.3d 410 ("[S]tatutes should be
construed so that no part or provision will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant." (quotation omitted).)
Subsection 2(c) is an essential provision of the plea withdrawal statute. In
fact, the Utah Supreme Court has relied on that provision to uphold the
constitutionality of the plea withdrawal statute, noting that subsection 2(c)
provides defendants with the fundamental constitutional requirement of an
((j)

appeal. Gailey, 2016 UT 35, 1,r 24-25. The Supreme Court reasoned that even
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though a defendant cannot challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal if he does
not timely move to withdraw his plea in the district court, he "is not left without
recourse to challenge [his] guilty plea post-sentencing; [he] may challenge [his]
plea in a postconviction proceeding as provided for in the PCRA, including
eventual plenary review by an appellate court." Gailey, 2016 UT 35, ,I 24.

Brown's holding that a defendant cannot challenge a guilty plea in
postconviction proceedings if the defendant did not first move to withdraw the
plea is supported by very brief analysis-three short paragraphs, most of which
are spent quoting either the district court or the defendant. And there is no
mention of the plea withdrawal statute. The implications of Brown's holding on
subsection 2(c) of the plea withdrawal statute did not appear to be before the

Brown court.
Moreover, under the canons of statutory interpretation, subsection 2(c) of
the plea withdrawal statute (Utah Code§ 77-13-6(2)(c)) would govern over the
procedural bar of the postconviction statute (Utah Code§ 78B-9-106(1)(c)).
"When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the more specific provision
will govern over the more general provision." Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Co., 681 P.2d 214,216 (Utah 1984). For example, "where the Uniform
Commercial Code sets forth a limitation period for a specific type of action, this
limitation controls over an older, more general statute of limitations." Id.
Similarly, the procedural bar of the postconviction statute generally limits what
types of claims can be brought in postconviction proceedings. However, the most
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specific plea withdrawal statute carves out an exception and allows individuals
who have not sought to withdraw their plea in the district court to challenge their
pleas in postconviction proceeding. The specific provision in the plea withdrawal
statute would govern, allowing individuals to challenge their pleas in
postconviction proceedings if they have not first sought to withdraw them in the
district court.
For all these reasons, this Court should reject the State's procedural bar
argument.
1.2

Mr. Arriaga's Guilty Plea Claim Is Preserved

The State argues that Mr. Arriaga's claim that his plea was not knowing or
voluntary was not preserved in the district court. But the State is incorrect.
Contrary to the State's argument that Mr. Arriaga never raised his guilty
plea claim in his postconviction petitions, Mr. Arriaga did raise that his plea was
not knowing or voluntary in his Amended Petition for Relief Under the
Postconviction Remedies Act and in his Second Amended Petitioner for Relief
Under the Postconviction Remedies Act. (See R. 71 ("Conviction obtained by plea
of guilty that was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily with understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea."); R. 450
("Petitioner's conviction was obtained by a plea of guilty that was unlawfully
induced or not made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea.").) Mr. Arriaga specifically asserted that
@)

"during the plea colloquy, [Mr. Arriaga] told the Court that he acted in self-
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defense, manifesting that he did not agree that he had committed the crime of
murder." (R. 448.)
The State appears to be arguing that Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea claim in his
postconviction petitions was not specific enough and that it was not preserved
because the State did not understand the full nature of Mr. Arriaga's legal
arguments until the summary judgment stage. The State seems to be advocating
for a higher pleading standard than is required. Postconviction petitioners are
only required to state in their petitions "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts
that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(d)(3).
Petitioners are not allowed to "set forth argument or citations or discuss
authorities in the petition." Id. 65C(-O. And when doing its required review of the
petition for frivolous claims, the district court "need only determine whether the
petition contains sufficient facts to state a cause of action." Moench v. State,

2002 UT App 333, ,r 7, 57 P .3d 1116.
Here, Mr. Arriaga raised in his postconviction petitions that his guilty plea
was not knowing or voluntary, and he also asserted that he told the district court
during his plea colloquy that he was acting in self-defense. (R. 71, 448, 450.) Mr.
Arriaga properly pleaded his guilty plea claim. The rules do not require-or even
allow-postconviction petitioners to explain their legal reasoning in their
petition; that the State did not fully understand the legal underpinnings of Mr.
Arriaga's guilty plea claim until the summary judgment stage is a consequence of
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~

the procedural rules that govern postconviction proceedings, not Mr. Arriaga's
lack of preservation.
Furthermore, under a correct understanding of the preservation doctrine,
Mr. Arriaga clearly preserved his challenge that his guilty plea was not knowing
or voluntary. "To preserve an issue, counsel must raise the issue in the trial court
in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." State

v. Bird, 2015 UT 7, ,I 10,345 P.3d 1141 (quotation omitted). "To properly preserve
an issue at the district court, the following must take place: (1) the issue must be
raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party
must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." O'Dea v. Olea,
2009 UT 46,, 18, 217 P.3d 704 (quotation omitted). Mr. Arriaga satisfied all
three factors.
First, Mr. Arriaga raised his guilty plea claim in a timely manner. As noted
above, he alleged in his amended and second amended petitions for
postconviction relief that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, and in his
factual recitals he noted that he asserted that he acted in self-defense during the
plea colloquy. (R. 71, 448, 450.) Furthermore, he raised the issue in his
opposition to the State's summary judgment motion. (R. 1108-1112.) The State
had an opportunity to respond to his argument in its reply. (R. 1202.) Mr. Arriaga
then argued at length in the summary judgment hearing that his plea was not
knowing or voluntary. (R. 1323-41.) And the district court rejected that argument
in its order; it concluded that "[a]ll the constitutional prerequisites for a valid
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guilty plea were satisfied in Mr. Arriaga's case." (R. 1270.) Certainly the district
court had the opportunity to thoroughly assess and consider Mr. Arriaga's guilty
plea claim.
Second, the issue was specifically raised. Mr. Arriaga argued in his
opposition to summary judgment that his plea was not knowing or voluntary
because he did not understand the essential elements of the crime to which he
pleaded guilty. (R. 1108-1112.) The district court's order shows that it understood
Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea claim. The district court found, "After trial counsel
provided the factual basis for the offense, Mr. Arriaga told the Court that the
victim was on drugs and drunk, that he was unsure whether the victim had a
weapon, that he defended himself against the victim, and that it was not his
intention to hurt the victim." (R. 1266.) The Court specifically addressed Mr.
Arriaga's arguments when it held that "[a]ll the constitutional prerequisites for a
valid guilty plea were satisfied" and that "any misunderstanding was cured by the
Court's plea colloquy and the Plea Statement." (R. 1270.)
Third, Mr. Arriaga provided sufficient evidence and legal support for his
argument in the opposition to his summary judgment motion. (See R. 1108-1112.)
He cited from the record, and he provided the district court with cases and
statutes. (See id.) The district court had sufficient legal authority and evidence
before it to make a reasoned and informed conclusion about Mr. Arriaga's guilty
plea claim.
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ti)

Ci

The preservation doctrine prevents appellants from raising issues on
appeal that were inadequately raised in the district court; the doctrine promotes
judicial efficiency in that it allows district courts to first correct errors and make
reasoned decisions before the issues are brought to the appellate courts, and the
doctrine prevents appellants from surprising appellees with arguments on appeal
never before raised.
Addressing the merits of this case upholds the purposes of the preservation
doctrine. Mr. Arriaga gave the district court sufficient evidence and legal
authority on his guilty plea claim in his summary judgment opposition, and he
argued about his claim at length in the summary judgment hearing. (R. 11081112, 1323-41.) The district court was well aware of Mr. Arriaga's legal claims

before it issued its order. Furthermore, the State was also well aware of Mr.
v.G)

Arriaga' s legal claims during the summary judgment proceedings and had an
opportunity to respond to them. Mr. Arriaga's arguments in his appeal come as
no surprise to the State.

1.3

Mr. Arriaga's Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary

Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Twice during the
plea hearing he made self-defense claims that negated an essential element of the
murder charge and provided objective evidence that he did not understand the
proceedings. And looking beyond the record of the plea hearing, Mr. Arriaga
produced undisputed evidence that the language barrier between him and his
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trial counsel prevented him from understanding the nature and consequences of
his plea.
The State's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. In fact, the State
does not address the case law that holds that a defendant's statements during a
plea colloquy that negate an element of a crime can render a plea not knowing or
voluntary. See United States v. Culbertson, 670 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2012)
(vacating guilty plea when the defendant persistently disavowed responsibility for
G&J

a certain amount of drugs during the colloquy, and the amount of drugs was an
essential element of the crime); United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d
761,771 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that Spanish-speaking defendant did not
understand the nature of the conspiracy charges against him when he made
statements during his plea hearing that showed he did not understand the
concept of conspiracy or the specific acts to which he was pleading guilty); United

States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020, 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
Spanish-speaking defendant did not understand charges he was pleading to when
he made statements during the colloquy that showed he was confused and the
district court did not clear up his confusion); People v. Ramirez, 839 N.Y.S.2d
327, 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (holding that plea was not voluntary when
defendant made statements during the colloquy that negated his plea and district
court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry); State v. Thurman, 911 P .2d 371, 375
(Utah 1996) (holding that even though defendant acknowledged at one point he

10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had the appropriate mental state, he made repeated comments that negated his
admission and consequently did not admit to the requisite mental state).
Instead, the State makes several arguments that elevate procedure (signing
the plea statement, conversing with trial counsel, etc.) over what actually was
said during Mr. Arriaga's plea colloquy.

First, the State incorrectly asserts that the absence of selfdefense is not an essential element of the crime of murder, citing an old
Utah Supreme Court case (State v. Knoll, 712 P .2d 211 (Utah 1985)) for support.
But much more recently, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[a] necessary

element of a murder conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses." State v.

Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r 45,192 P.3d 867 (emphasis added). "It is fundamental that
the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element
of an offense, including the absence of an affirmative defense once the defense is
put into issue." Id. (quotation omitted). Consequently, "the absence of affirmative
defenses is an element of murder." Id.

Second, based on the record before this Court, Mr. Arriaga has
overcome the presumption that his trial counsel adequately explained
his self-defense claim. A plea is constitutionally valid if the defendant receives
"real notice" of the charge against him, and "real notice" requires both an
understanding of the charge to which the defendant is pleading guilty and its
elements. Hicks v. Franklin, 546 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008). "Where a
defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on
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that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the
nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty." Bradshaw v.

Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). However, the presumption that a defendant's
trial counsel has appropriately informed the defendant can be overcome by
statements a defendant makes during the plea colloquy.
For example, in Hicks v. Franklin, the Tenth Circuit held that the
defendant overcame the presumption that his counsel adequately informed him
about the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty-second degree
(depraved mind) murder. 546 F.3d at 1285. In that case, the defendant first
affirmed during the plea colloquy that he had "talked over the charges" with his
attorney. Id. But when the district court asked whether the defendant understood
the charge, the defendant stated that he did not know what a "dangerous act"
meant. Id. Furthermore, the district court's explanation of "dangerous act" was
erroneous, and the defendant's attorney remained silent and did not correct the
district court's misstatement. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded, "[W]here a
defendant affirmatively indicates to the court that he does not understand a
critical element of the charge against him, the presumption that a defendant has
been sufficiently notified by defense counsel of what he is being asked to admit
will typically be unwarranted." Id.

<i)

In United States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2011), the Tenth Circuit
again held that a defendant's statements during a plea colloquy rebutted the
presumption that his counsel adequately informed him of the elements of the
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crime to which he was pleading. Again in that case, the defendant affirmed
during the plea colloquy that he fully discussed the conspiracy charge against him
with his attorney. 653 F.3d at 1202. But he made statements during the plea
colloquy that showed that he did not understand the elements of conspiracy;
specifically, he denied that he had "knowingly" done an act but was just a "party
to it." Id. The district court attempted to clear up the confusion; the defendant
eventually affirmed that he now knew that there was a violation of the law. Id. at
1203. But the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant's admission "that he now
knows those activities violated the law, is not definitively an admission he knew
at the time he agreed to the activities that they were illegal." Id.
Similar to the defendants in Hicks and Weeks, Mr. Arriaga affirmed during
the plea colloquy that the understood his conversations with his attorney, that he
Ci

had been through a plea form with his attorney, and that he did not have
questions. (R. 412-13.) But the plea colloquy did not stop there. Mr. Arriaga
made self-defense assertions after his attorney gave a factual basis for his murder
plea, and Mr. Arriaga again asserted self-defense after his attorney informed the
district court that he had spoken with Mr. Arriaga about imperfect self-defense.
(R. 413.) At no time did the district court or trial counsel explain to Mr. Arriaga
the implications of his self-defense claim, and Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel did not
ask for a recess to clear up Mr. Arriaga's confusion. (R. 413-414.) Mr. Arriaga's
statements during the plea colloquy itself-self-defense assertions that were
never sufficiently alleviated-rebut the presumption that Mr. Arriaga's trial
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counsel adequately explained the implications of Mr. Arriaga's self-defense
claims.
Furthermore, Mr. Arriaga never recanted his self-defense assertions on the
record during the plea colloquy. (Id.) Rather, he affirmed that he knew he would
kill the victim by pulling the trigger. (R. 414.) But merely affirming that he pulled
the trigger is insufficient for a first-degree murder plea. Once a defendant raises a
claim that he was acting in self-defense, the State bears the burden of proving
otherwise. Low, 2008 UT 58, , 45. "[T]he absence of affirmative defenses is an
element of murder." Id. Because Mr. Arriaga made statements that he was acting
in self-defense and did not recant those statements, he did not understand the
elements of murder.
Moreover, Mr. Arriaga's self-defense claims were not mitigated by any
explanation or inquiry by the district court or trial counsel. (R. 413-15.) And his
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea said nothing about self-defense
or about the State having the burden of disproving self-defense. (R. 79-87.)
The presumption that Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel adequately explained the
implications of the self-defense claims to Mr. Arriaga is rebutted by evidence on
the record-Mr. Arriaga's self-defense assertions during the colloquy (one of
which was made after his trial counsel said he had explained the self-defense
claims to Mr. Arriaga), the failure of the district court or trial counsel to explain
the self-defense claims to Mr. Arriaga on the record, and the absence of any
information about self-defense in the Statement of the Defendant.
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Third, the State incorrectly asserts that the Court should not
give credence to Mr. Arriaga's affidavit filed with his postconviction
petition, where Mr. Arriaga asserted that he did not understand his trial
counsel's advice about pleading guilty. It is true that a defendant cannot merely
allege in a postconviction petition that he did not understand what was going on
during the plea colloquy. But that is not the case here. Mr. Arriaga's
postconviction affidavit explains why he made multiple self-defense assertions
during his plea colloquy, despite his attorney representing to the district court
that he had explained the implications of the self-defense claims to Mr. Arriaga.
His postconviction petition affidavit does not contradict what happened during
the plea colloquy.

Fourth, the State incorrectly argues that the plea colloquy and
the Statement of Defendant corrected any of Mr. Arriaga's
misunderstandings. As noted above, Mr. Arriaga's self-defense claims were
not mitigated by any explanation or inquiry by the district court or trial counsel.
(R. 413-15.) And his Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea said
nothing about self-defense or about the State having the burden of disproving
self-defense. (R. 79-87.) Mr. Arriaga never recanted his self-defense claims. (R.

Fifth, the State improperly relies on Mr. Arriaga's past
experience with the criminaljustice system to assume that Mr.
Arriaga knew what he was doing in this case. The State argues that
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because Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty in 2003 and 2004 to misdemeanors and
third-degree felonies that he knew what he was doing in this case. But that claim
is entirely speculative. The record does not give any indication about what type of
representation Mr. Arriaga received in those cases. And those pleas occurred
approximately seven years before the plea in this case to crimes that were far less
significant than first-degree murder. Assuming that Mr. Arriaga knew what he
was doing merely because he had pleaded guilty seven years before-in the face of
his self-defense claims during the colloquy and the undisputed record evidence of
the unmitigated language barrier between him and his trial counsel- is a
speculative leap this Court should not take.
Given the evidence in the record, Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea was not knowing
or voluntary.
This Court need not worry that a ruling in Mr. Arriaga's favor would open
the floodgates for other criminal defendants to challenge their guilty pleas. This
case presents a unique situation where a non-English-speaking defendant made
self-defense claims during the plea colloquy that were not resolved by the district
court or trial counsel.
Had the district court inquired about the self-defense claims, had anyone
explained on the record the burden of proof for the self-defense claim, had the
Statement of Defendant included the relevant information about self-defense
claims, had Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel explained to Mr. Arriaga on the record the
implications of self-defense claims, had Mr. Arriaga recanted his self-defense
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assertions-had any of those things happened, Mr. Arriaga's postconviction
appeal probably would not be meritorious. But none of those things happened.
And because they did not, Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary.
Mr. Arriaga respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the
district court.
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2.

Mr. Arriaga's Counsel Was Ineffective
Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel was deficient when he did not use an interpreter

to advise Mr. Arriaga about his guilty plea in a private conference before the
guilty plea proceeding began.
The State attacks Mr. Arriaga's ineffectiveness claim by challenging his
postconviction affidavit. As argued above, Mr. Arriaga's postconviction affidavit
explains why he made multiple self-defense assertions during his plea colloquy,
i>

despite his attorney representing to the district court that he had explained the
implications of his self-defense claims to Mr. Arriaga. His postconviction petition
affidavit is not self-serving; in fact, it does not contradict what happened during
the plea colloquy.
In attacking Mr. Arriaga's postconviction affidavit, the State forgets that
the assertions in the affidavit are undisputed. Mr. Arriaga submitted his affidavit

with his summary judgment opposition, and the State did not dispute any of the
facts of his affidavit in its reply. (R. 823-28; 1198-1204.) From an appellate
perspective, this Court must take the assertions in Mr. Arriaga's affidavit as true.
The State also argues that Mr. Arriaga did not have a viable imperfect selfdefense claim that he could raise at trial. But this is incorrect.
"When a criminal defendant requests a jury instruction regarding a
particular affirmative defense, the court is obligated to give the instruction if
evidence has been presented-either by the prosecution or by the defendant-that
provides any reasonable basis upon which a jury could conclude that the
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affirmative defense applies to the defendant." Low, 2008 UT 58, ,I 25. Looking at
the facts most favorably to Mr. Arriaga, Mr. Arriaga presented sufficient evidence
where the district court would have been required to give an imperfect selfdefense instruction to a jury.
Mr. Arriaga was angry and confronted the decedent, wanting him to admit
that his wife was having an affair with the decedent. (R. 166-67, 176, 213-14,
288.) The two exchanged punches, Mr. Arriaga pulled a gun out of his waistband
to scare the decedent (Mr. Arriaga did not intend to shoot him), and then the
decedent lunged at Mr. Arriaga and tried to grab the gun. (R. 167, 177, 228.) The
gun went off, and the decedent was shot five times. (R. 141.) Viewed most
favorably to Mr. Arriaga, the evidence in the record is that Mr. Arriaga never
intended to shoot the decedent; rather, he was in a fight with the decedent and
only pulled the trigger after the decedent lunged at him. See State v. Low, 2008
UT 58, ,I 34 (noting that district court properly instructed the jury on imperfect
self-defense when the defendant testified that he fired a gun only after the
decedent charged him); State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ,I 31, 349 P .3d 712 (reasoning
that there was evident that supported an inference that a murder was
unintentional when there was testimony that the gun fired inadvertently during a
struggle with the victim). The number of times the decedent was shot and Mr.
Arriaga's disposal of the gun do not automatically negate Mr. Arriaga's selfdefense claim; rather, they are facts that the jury would have to weigh in deciding
whether Mr. Arriaga's testimony about the events was credible.
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Finally, the State makes several arguments about the plea hearing
correcting any of Mr. Arriaga's misunderstanding and about Mr. Arriaga
understanding his plea because of his experience with the criminal justice system.
Those arguments have been addressed in section 1.3, supra.

i
i

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Arriaga respectfully requests this Court
reverse the district court's grant of summazy judgment.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2016.

ADAMS LEGAL LLC

POBox1564

Bountiful, 1IT 84011
eadams@adamslegalllc.com
(801) 309-9625

Attorneyfor Defendant/Appellant
BeajaminArriaga
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